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KILLING IN DEFENCE OF PROPERTY UNDER BRUNEI
PENAL LAWS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Killing in defence of property is a legal issue as well as a practical problem. As the
general public do not fully grasp the law of private defence, they are likely to have
impromptu responses in situations where they are unlawfully attacked and their
possessions unlawfully appropriated. Killing in defence of property is recognised
both under the Brunei Penal Code (Cap.22) and the Brunei Shariah Penal
Code Order, 2013. This is by virtue of section 103 and section 32 respectively.
The paper aims to comparatively analyse the two sections in terms of the operation
of the right of private defence of property justifying the killing of the aggressor. The
paper concludes that the issue of whether the law should ever justify the killing in
defence of property is a question which cannot be easily answered and recommends
that the right to kill in defence of property must be carefully circumscribed.
The right of private defence of property only comes into operation
when certain specified offences against property are committed or
attempted to be committed.1 Hence, the right of a man to protect
his person or property from injury is known as the right of private
defence or self-defence. The basic principle underlying the doctrine
of the right of private defence is that when an individual or his
property is faced with a danger and immediate aid from the State
machinery is not readily available, that invididual is entitled to
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protect himself and his property. The right of private defence is
absolutely necessary for the protection of ones life, liberty and
property. The right of private defence is a defensive right
circumscribed in the Brunei Penal Code (Cap.22) [hereinafter
referred to as the ‘Code’] and the Brunei Shariah Penal Code Order,
2013 [hereinafter referred to as the ‘Order’]. It is only available
when the circumstances clearly justify it. Section 103 of the Code
sets out the situations whereby the right of private defence of
property extends to the voluntary causing of death or harm to the
wrongdoer.2
On the other hand, section 32 of the Order indicates when a
person can be killed in defence of property.3 Hence, the right of
private defence of property  justifying even the killing of the
aggressor in Brunei is governed by two sets of laws in relation to
the application of the defence. In other words, the right of private
defence of property is governed by both the Code and the Order.
However, it is interesting to note that the Order applies to both
Muslims and non-Muslims in relation to offences contained therein
unless otherwise provided.4 The paper submits that the right of
private defence of property to the extent of causing death of the
wrongdoer/agggressor requires an in-depth comparative analysis
of both section 103 of the Code and section 32 of the Order.
The paper aims to comparatively analysis the operation of the
right of private defence of property to the extent of causing death
of the wrongdoer/aggressor by making reference to section 103  of
the Code and section 32 of the Order. In analysing these two
sections, the authors intend to evaluate the similarities and
dissimilarities in terms of the operation of the sections. The paper
argues that the enactment of the Shariah Penal Code Order, 2013
in Brunei is in reality the result of the process of harmonisation of
civil law with Islamic law in relation to crime.
The paper is divided into four parts excluding the introduction.
The first part addresses the right of private defence of property as
stipulated under section 103 of the Code. Under this part, the
paper intends to address the different situations whereby the right
of private defence extends to the voluntary causing of death or
harm to the wrongdoer/aggressor. The second part addresses the
right of private defence of property as stipulated under section 32
of the Order. In addressing the provisions of section 32, the paper
intends to pay attention to the situations when a person can be
killed in defence of property. The third part addresses the issue of
comparative analysis in terms of the operation of the right of private
defence of property justifying the killing of the aggressor/
wrongdoer as provided under both sections. The fourth part focuses
on the conclusion. This part will embrace some recommendations
in terms of the operation of the right of private defence of property
in the context of section 103 Code and section 32 of the Order.
Section 103 of the Code sets out the situations whereby the right
of private defence of property extends to the voluntary causing of
death or harm to the wrongdoer. The section reads: “The right of
private defence of property extends, under the restrictions
mentioned in section 99, to the voluntary causing of death, or of
any other harm to the wrongdoer, if the offence, the committing
of which, or the attempting to commit which, occasions the
exercise of the right is an offence of any of the following descriptions-
(a) robbery;
(b) house-breaking by night;
(c) mischief by fire committed on any building, tent or vessel,
which building, tent or vessel is used as a human dwelling,
or as a place for the custody of property;
(d) theft, mischief or house-trespass, under such circumstances
as may reasonably cause apprehension that death or
grievous hurt will be the consequence, if such right of
private defence is not exercised”.
This section indicates when a person can be killed in defence
of property. But the section is subject to the provisions of section
99. In addressing the operation of the right of private defence of
property justifying the killing of the wrongdoer, it is important
that section 103 must be read together with section 99. Section
99 limits the right of private defence. It is clear that from the
provisions of section 103, a person exercising his right of private
defence of his own property or the property of any other person,
may cause the death of the wrongdoer if the offence against property
is for the purpose of robbery, house-breaking by night, mischief
by fire committed on any building, tent or vessel used as a human
dwelling, theft or house-trespass which reasonably causes
apprehension of death or grievous hurt.
The right subsumed in the section is an expansion of the right
of private defence founded in section 97. When section 97 and
section 103 are telescoped with each other the right of private
defence can be stretched up to the extent of killing another person
in defending the property of not only his own but even another
person. Therefore, such right would be available to a public servant
if the property sought to be protected is a public property.5 But
there is a condition for claiming such an extended right if the
property sought to be protected is a building. It should be a
building used for human dwelling or for custody of property.
In addition, if an offence committed by the wrongdoer is not
one of the offences that is laid down in section 103 of the Code
(for example, the wrongdoer merely commits theft, mischief,
house-trespass or house-breaking in the day time), then the person
defending the property can cause any harm other than death to
the wrongdoer. This is provided for in section 104 of the Code. In
other words, the building in question must be a building used for
human dwelling or for custody of property to justify the killing.
Therefore, if it is not a building of that type the person exercising
right of private defence cannot go to the fartherest extent of killing
another person unless the threatened mischief has caused a
reasonable apprehension that death or grievous hurt would
otherwise be the consequence.6 In other words, the right extends
not only when the offences enumerated in the section are
committed, but also when an attempt to commit any such offence
is made.7
Section 104 contains the bridle that the right of private defence
shall not cross the limit of first degree as against acts which would
remain as theft, mischief or criminal trespass. But section 103
recognises extension of the said right up to the full measure, even
as against the aforesaid acts but only if such acts or their attempts
are capable of inculcating reasonable apprehension in the mind
that death or grievous hurt would be the consequence if the right
is not exercised in such full measure.8 Section 103 of the Brunei
Penal Code corresponds with section 103 of the respective
Malaysian, Singapore and Indian Penal Codes. Therefore, cases
from these jurisdictions can be referred to in order to grasp the
operation of the right of private defence as stipulated under section
103 of the Code. Section 103 provides four situations when a
person can be killed in defence of property. The following are the
four situations.
Section 390 of the Code defines the offence of robbery. In all
robbery there is either theft9 or extortion.10 Section 390 enumerates
the various instances whereby theft or extortion constitute robbery.
For example, theft amounts to robbery if in order to commit the
theft, or whilst committing theft or in carrying away or attempting
to carry away property obtained by theft, the offender for any of
the above mentioned purposes voluntarily11 causes or attempts to
cause death,12 hurt,13 or wrongful restraint14 or fear15 of instant
death or instant hurt or wronngful restraint. Robbery by violence
may be resisted by violence sufficent to overcome the force
employed by the attacker, and if, in the course of such resistance,
death is caused, it may be justified if the right of self-defence was
exercised reasonably and properly, but the measure of self-defence
must always be proportionate to the quantum of force used by the
attacker and which it is necessary to repel.16
In Guru Charan Chang,17 the accused in resisting a sudden
attack made upon them by other persons and they had no time to
complain to the police, inflicted a wound on one of them with a
bamboo, from which one man died. The court held that the force
used by the accused was not such as to exceed the right of private
defence of property. The paper argues that since section 103 must
be read together with section 99, it is important that there must
be no more harm inflicted than is necessary for the purpose of the
right of private defence. The amount of force necessary depends
on the circumstances of the case.
In Gurdatta Mal,18 the deceased was harvesting crop under
the protection of police. The accused who claimed the crop did
not approach the authorities for redress and attacked the deceased
with guns and other dangerous weapons. It was held by the
Supreme Court that the act of the deceased did not amount to
robbery and that the accused had no right of private defence of
property. Again, it is important to note that there is no right of
private defence if there is time to have recourse to the protection
of public authorities. No man has a right to take the law into his
own hands for the protection of his person or property, if there is
reasonable opportunity of redress by recourse to the public
authorities.19 The paper submits that if a person prefers to use
force in order to protect his property when he could, for the
protection of such property, easily have recourse to the public
authorities, his use of force is made punishaable.20
Section 445 of the Code sets out illustratively the various instances
where house-breaking can occur. On the other hand, section 446
defines house-breaking by night. When house-breaking is
aggravated by reason that it was committed during the hours of
darkness it amounts to house-breaking by night.21 In the context
of this paper, it is important to point out that the right of private
defence of property to the extent of causing death arises not only
when the house is broken into but when an attempt is made to
break into the house. It is not the intention of the law that the
right to defend property is available only when the thief has already
effected entry, for property may be protected by attacking the
thief inside the house as much as by preventing his entry into it.22
In Ali Mea v King Emperor,23 the accused was led honestly to
believe that a burglar was attempting to enter his house and thus
caused the death of that person, who was his own nephew. The
court held that he did not exceed the right of private defence of
property and had not committed any offence. Thus, it would suffice
to note that the force used by the accused here could be construed
as necessary in order to protect his property. True the extent of
harm is limited by the rule that it is unlawful to kill an attacker,
but if the crime he is attempting is one described under section
100 or section 103, then such killing is justified.
In Pelkoo Nushyo,24 the accused found two men close to an
aperture made in his house for committing burglary. One of them
made off but the other advanced to attack the accused, when the
latter gave him a blow in the dark with a club, which killed him. It
was held that the accused was justified in his act. Looking at the
court’s decision, it is vital to note that the right to private defence is
available only to one who is suddenly confronted with immediate
necessity of averting an impending danger not of his own creation.
In addition, the right of private defence commences as soon as there
is reasonable apprehension of danger to the property and this right
continues so long as such apprehension of danger continues.25
Looking at the operation of clause (b) to section 103 above,
the paper submits that the inmates of a house have the right, in
the exercise of the right of private defence of property, of causing
even death of an offender who commits burglary or house-breaking.
However, this right of killing an offender is subject to provisions
of section 99, which lay down very clearly that the right of private
defence in no case extends to the inflicting of more harm than it is
necessary to inflict for the purpose of the defence. Based on this
assertion, the right of private defence of property failed in the case
of Mahabir,26 where the owners of a house had the thief at their
mercy as he was coming out of a hole in the wall and it was not
necessary for them to beat him to death. The court held that they
exceeded the right of private defence of property.
Section 425 of the Code defines the offence of mischief. Section
425 corresponds with section 425 of the Malaysian, Singapore
and Indian Penal Codes. In addressing the operation of clause (c)
to section 103, it is of paramount importance to point out that
there must be a wilful act of mischief. Explanation 1 also states
that mischief will be proved as long as any wrongful loss or damage
to any person is caused by injuring any property, regardless of
whether the property belongs to that person. Explanation 2 further
provides for the joint liability of a person who, either on his own,
or together with others, commits an act of mischief to property
belonging to himself. The illustrations to section 425 provide
examples of situations where the act of mischief can occur. In
analysing the operation of clause (c) to section 103, it is important
to point out that if a person commits mischief by setting fire on
any building, tent or vessel which is used for human dwelling, or
as a place for the custody of property; another person has a right
to cause death of that person under the right of private defence of
property.
In Mohinder Pal Jolly,27 the court rejected the appellant’s claim
of exercising the right of private defence when he killed the
deceased. The deceased and his colleagues were workers in a factory
belonging to the accused. On the day of the occurrence, some of
the workers including the deceased assembled outside the boundary
walls of the factory and started rasing provocative slogans in support
of their demand for wages during the period of lay-off. They also
hurled brickbats damaging some articles and endangering it to
further damage. The appellant then came out of his office room
and fired two shots at the workers. One shot hit the deceased on
his forehead, killing him instantaneously. The right of private
defence of property in the appellant’s case extended only on the
causing of any harm other than causing death. Hence, the appellant
was held to have exceeded his right of private defence. It would
suffice to note that the extent of the harm which is lawful to inflict
in the exercise of private defence is limited. In other words, the
infliction of more harm than is necessary for the purpose of private
defence is prohibited.28
The fourth clause to section 103 refers to three situations where
the death of the aggressor is justified in the context of the right of
private defence of property. The three situations are: theft, mischief
and house-trespass. The paper intends to pay attention to the
situation of theft and house-trespass since the situation of mischief
has been highlighted above. However, where relevant reference
will still be made to the situation of mischief in the context of the
operation of clause (d) to section 103. This is because the operation
of mischief under clause (c) to section 103 above is very specific in
nature, i.e., causing mischief by fire.
As for theft, reference has to be made to section 378 of the
Code. This section defines the offence of theft of movable property.
It defines the circumstances when dishonest deprivation of
possession of movable property amounts to the offence of theft.29
Section 378 of the Code corresponds with section 378 of the
Malaysian, Singapore and Indian Penal Codes. In the context of
this paper, clause (d) to section 103 protects a person who has
caused death, if the death has been caused in the exercise of the
right of private defence in certain circumstances. The clause deals
specifically with cases where the act which causes the exercise of
the right of private defence amounts to theft, mischief or house-
trespass.
The clause, however, does not justify the causing of death in
all cases in which these offences are being committed. The clause
means that when the act is such as per se to cause a reasonable
apprehension that death or grievous hurt will be the result, then
the causing of death in order to prevent the commission of such
act is justified. In other words, if any offence of theft, mischief or
house-trespassing is being committed on someone’s property, a
person generally cannot cause death of the offender. But if the
person is under a reasonable fear that if he will not cause death of
that person, the result will be his death or grievous hurt, he can
cause death of the offender.
In addressing the operation of clause (d) to section 103, it is
important to note that in Kanchan v State,30 the court observed
that just because mischief was committed by the victim and his
companions on the property of the accused, the accused does not
have a right to cause death. There must be reasonable apprehension
that death or grievous hurt may otherwise be the consequence.
The paper submits that it is important to fulfil the requirement of
reasonable apprehension that death or grievous hurt would be the
consequence if such right justifying the killing of the aggressor is
not exercised. Therefore, it is important to consider whether the
accused had any reasonable apprehension that death or grievous
hurt may otherwise be the consequence in the absence of exercising
the right of private defence of property under clause (d) to section
103.
Turning now to house-trespass, section 442 defines house-
trespass. House-trespass is an aggravated form of criminal trespass
due to the manner in which it is committed or for the purpose it
is committed. It is vital to note that criminal trespass is not
enumerated as one of the offences under section 103. Therefore,
the right of private defence of property will not extend to the
causing of death of the person who committed such acts, if the act
of trespass is in respect of an open land.31 However, in the context
of a dwelling house, it stands on a different footing. The law has
always looked with special indulgence on a man who is defending
his dwelling against those who would unlawfully evict him; as for
‘the house of everyone is to him as his castle and fortress’.32 In the
English case of Hussey,33 it was stated it would be lawful for a man
to kill one who would unlawfully dispossess him of his home.
In Gurdev Singh,34 the deceased was suspected of carrying on
an affair with the appellant’s wife. He had committed lurking
house-trespass by night into the residence of the appellant for
committing adultery and the appellant killed him. It was held
that the appellant had the right of private defence of property to
the extent of causing the deceased’s death. In another case of Kyaw
Zan Hla,35 a thief entered the sugar plantation of the deceased
and began to cut sugarcanes. The accused on hearing the sound
aimed with a cross-bow in the direction of the sound and shot.
The bow hit the thief in the side and caused his death. It was held
that the accused was justified in defending his property by shooting
an arrow at the thief.
Section 32 of the Order provides for the circumstances when the
right of private defence of property justifies the killing or causing
any other harm to the wrongdoer. The section reads:
“The right of private defence of property extends, under the
restrictions mentioned in section 28, to the voluntary causing the
death, or of any other harm to the wrongdoer, if the offence, the
committing of which, or the attempting to commit which, occasions
the exercise of the right, be an offence of any of the descriptions
hereinafter enumerated-
(a) hirabah
(b) sariqah, under such circumstances as may reasonably cause
apprehension that death or hurt will be the consequence,
if such right of private defence is not exercised”.
Before analysing the provisions of section 32 above, it is
important to note that the right of private defence has been
recognised in Islamic law. For example, if a person attacks another
person with the intention of causing his death and the other in
self-defence attacks him and causes his death, he will not be liable
for intentional homicide. The Quran states: “Then if anyone takes
aggressive against you, take the aggressive against him”.36 Based
on this Quranic verse, the defence of one’s life is a valid defence
against allegations of criminal liability if an individual kills another
person in order to prevent the threat of being killed by the
assailant.37 Thus, the act of a person in his self-defence is not an
offence and is not subject to any civil or criminal liability. However,
if he crosses the limits prescribed for such defence, his act becomes
an offence liable to criminal and civil liabilities.38
According to the preferred opinion of Imam Abu Hanifah,
Imam Malik and Imam Shafi’e, the right to kill a person in self-
defence limits the case to an attack on the body of that person or
the body of another person. However, some jurists extend the
right of legal defence to the defence of property and allow a person
to kill the person who takes away his property forcibly and such a
person has no other means to prevent him except to kill him. This
opinion is based on the hadith narrated on the authority of Abu
Huraiyrah that a person came to the Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w.)
and said: “Oh Prophet! What should I do when a person takes
away my property?” The Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w.) said: “Don’t
give him your property”. He said: “What should I do if he quarrels
with me?” The Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w.) said: “Quarrel with
him”. He said: “If he kills me?” The Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w.)
said: “You are then a martyr”. He said: “If I kill him?” The Prophet
Muhammad (s.a.w.) said: “He will be in hell”.39
Turning back to section 32 of the Order, it would suffice to
note that the section cannot be read in isolation without making
reference to section 28. This is because section 28 sets out the limits
within which the right of private defence should be exercised. For
example, section 28(4) provides that the right of private defence in
no case extends to the infliction of more harm than it is necessary to
inflict for the purpose of the defence. In other words, the defendant
must act in defence with a force that commensurate with the
indispensable need. If the force used exceeds the limit of need, it
ceases to be defence and gains the status of aggression itself.40 Having
said that, section 32 provides two situations when a person can be
killed in defence of property. The following are the two situations.
Section 62 of the Order defines the offence of “hirabah” as an act
of taking another person’s property by force or threat of the use of
force done by a person or a group of persons armed with any
person or a group of persons armed with any weapon or instrument
capable of being used as weapon. By virtue of section 63 of the
Order, the punishment for hirabah can take a form of “hadd”41 or
“ta’zir”.42 In the context of this paper, it is important to point out
that it is possible to justify the killing of an aggressor/wrongdoer
in defence of one’s property.
In other words, one is permitted to use force to defend his
property provided certain conditions are fulfilled. Therefore,
Muslims jurists have unanimously described the following
conditions for the validity of legal defence whether of body or
honour or property of one self or of another person:43 (1) the act
of the aggressor must be transgression; (2) transgression is actually
committed; (3) it is not possible for the defender to defend himself
otherwise; and (4) the quantum of force used to deter the wrong
should be commensurate with the need to do so.
The paper submits that section 32 of the Order indicates when
a person can be killed in defence of property involving a case of
hirabah. It is equally important to point out that the right extends
not only when the offence of hirabah is committed, but also when
an attempt to commit it is made. However, as mentioned earlier,
the exercise of the right of private defence of property is limited
by section 28. For example, there is no right of private defence in
cases in which there is time to have recourse to the protection of
the public authorities.44 It is not permitted for the defendant to
resort to violence, if he can get the help of the public authorities
in time, or he can defend himself without adopting violent means.
Section 53 of the Order defines the offence of “sariqah” as an act of
removing by stealth a movable property from the hirza or possession
of its owner without his consent and with the intention to deprive
him thereof. On the other hand, the same section defines the
term “hirza” as custody of a property according to its suitability
based on Hukum Syara. Theft has been prohibited in Islam and
has been declared punishable crime for which punishment has
been fixed. The Quran says:45 “And as for the male thief and the
female thief, cut off their hands, as a recompense for what they
have earned, (and) a warning from Allah (s.w.t.); and Allah (s.w.t.)
is Mighty, Wise”.
Based on the Quranic verse above, it is clear that theft is
considered as a serious crime and subject to the hadd punishment.
However, for the offence of theft liable to hadd, it is vital to fulfil
certain requirements or conditions such as: (1) the offender must
be an adult and sane at the time of the commission of the offence;
(2) he must have committed theft intentionally; and (3) the stolen
property must be movable property and is equal to the nasib.
In the context of this paper, what is important is to address
the offence of sariqah in relation to the exercise of the right of
private defence justifying the killing of the wrongdoer by the
defendant. Clause (b) to section 32 of the Order deals with the
situation of sariqah where the defendant is allowed to exercise his
right of private defence of property to the extent of causing death
of the wrongdoer. The clause means that when the act is such as
per se to cause reasonable apprehension that death or hurt will be
the result, then the causing of death in order to prevent the
commission of such act is justified. In other words, the clause is
only applicable in a situation where the defendant is under a
reasonable fear that if he does not cause death of the wrongdoer,
the result will be his own death or hurt.
Since section 32 of the Order sets out two situations (i.e.,
hirabah and sariqah) justifying the killing of a wrongdoer in defence
of property, it is vital to address the difference between these two
situations. The difference between sariqah and hirabah is that sariqah
means to take away the property of another person surreptitiously
while hirabah means to take away the property of another person
by using force publicly. In other words, for the commission of the
offence of sariqah the use of force is not necessary. For example, the
movable property in question can be taken away by the wrongdoer
secretly or stealthily without the knowledge and consent of the
defendant. However, this is not the case with hirabah where the
use of force must be present.
As mentioned earlier, section 103 of the Code sets out the situations
(subsections (a) to (d)) whereby the right of private defence of
property extends to the voluntary causing of death or harm to the
wrongdoer. Similarly, section 32 of the Order deals with the right
of private defence of property to the extent of causing death of the
wrongdoer. The section sets out two situations (subsections (a)
and (b)) where the right of private defence of property extends to
the voluntary causing of death or harm to the wrongdoer by the
defendant. Based on these two sections, it is inevitable to point
out that there are some similarities and dissimilarities as well in
terms of the operation of the right of private defence of property
under the Code and the Order. The following are the similarities
and the dissimilarities.
Firstly, the operation of the right of private defence of property
under section 103 of the Code and section 32 of the Order
justifying the killing of the wrongdoer in defence of property are
both subject to some limitations. It is interesting to note that all
the four limitations imposed by section 99 of the Code and section
28 of the Order are identical with no linguistic alterations at all.
For example, section 99(3) provides that there is no right of private
defence in cases in which there is time to have recourse to the
protection of the public authorities. A similar and identical
sentiment is echoed by section 28(3) of the Order. Furthermore,
the two explanations to section 99 and section 28 are also identical
in terms of linguistic usage. In other words, Explanations 1 and 2
to section 99 and section 28 are identical with no linguistic
alterations. The paper argues that by adopting this kind of
approach in terms of the limitations imposed on the exercise of
the right of private defence both under the Code and the Order
with no linguistic alterations, the drafters of the Order have
attempted to harmonise Shari‘ah principles with contemporary
criminal jurisprudence in relation to private defence.
Secondly, both section 103 of the Code and section 32 of the
Order mention “robbery” or “hirabah” and “theft” or “sariqah” as
situations justifying the exercise of the right of private defence of
property to the extent of killing the wrongdoer/aggressor. In other
words, a defendant is protected if he has caused death in the exercise
of the right of private defence involving the offence of robbery or
theft. For example, robbery by violence may be resisted by violence
sufficient enough to overcome the force employed by the attacker.
Hence, in the course of such resistance, if death is caused, it may be
justified provided the right of self-defence was exercised reasonably
and properly. The measure of self-defence must always be
proportionate to the quantum of force used by the wrongdoer/
aggressor and which is necessary to repel. As for theft, there is no
doubt that it operates as one of the situations justifying the killing
of a wrongdoer both under section 103 and section 32 as mentioned
earlier in terms of the exercise of the right of private defence of
property. However, in relation to theft, there is a dissimilarity between
the two sections. The authors intend to address this issue in the
preceding part of this paper dealing with the dissimilarities.
Thirdly, the right of private defence of property under section
103 of the Code and section 32 of the Order extend not only
when the offences enumerated in the sections are committed, but
also when an attempt to commit any such offence is made. Hence,
the right of private defence of property to the extent of causing
death arises not only when “theft” is committed but when an
attempt is made to commit “theft”. It is not the intention of the
law that the right to defend property is available only when the
thief has already carried out the act in question. Thus, the property
may be protected by attacking the thief inside the house as much
as by preventing his entry into it. The same approach also applies
to the offence of “robbery” or “hirabah”.
Although both section 103 of the Code and section 32 of the
Order allow the right of private defence of property to the extent
of the voluntary causing of death or any other harm to the
wrongdoer, it is inevitable to point out that there are some
dissimilarities in terms of the operation of both sections. Section
103 of the Code allows the right of private defence of property to
the extent of the voluntary causing of death, if the offence involved
is any of the following descriptions: (a) robbery; (b) house-breaking
by night; (c) mischief by fire committed on any building, tent or
vessel, which building, tent or vessel is used as a human dwelling,
or as a place for the custody of property; (d) theft, mischief or
house-trespass, under such circumstances as may reasonably cause
apprehension that death or grievous hurt will be the consequence,
if such right of private defence is not exercised.
On the other hand, section 32 of the Order allows the right
of private defence of property to the extent of the voluntary causing
of death or any harm to the wrongdoer, if the offence involved is
any of the following descriptions: (a) hirabah; (b) sariqah, under
such circumstances as may reasonably cause apprehension that
death or hurt will be the consequence, if such right of private
defence is not exercised. In short, section 103 of the Code sets
four situations (subsections (a) to (d)) whereby the right of private
defence of property extends to the voluntary causing of death or
harm to the wrongdoer. This is not the case with section 32 of the
Order, which mentions only two situations (subsections (a) to
(b)) indicating when a person can be killed in defence of property.
In addition, section 32 of the Order provides only two
situations when a person can be killed in defence of property i.e.,
in case of hirabah or sariqah. The Order fails to provide any defence
in case there is mischief or house-breaking in terms of the exercise
of the right of private defence. The paper submits that the mention
of sariqah must be taken to include all offences ejusdem generis.
The same consideration applies to the mention of hirabah. As for
section 103 of the Code, it sets out four situations justifying the
killing of the wrongdoer in defence of property i.e., robbery; house-
breaking by night; mischief by fire; and theft, mischief or house-
trespass.
Another dissimilarity between section 103 of the Code and
section 32 of the Order can be seen from the offence of theft as
one of the situations indicating when a person can be killed in
defence of property. Section 103(d) deals specifically with cases
where the act which causes the exercise of the right of private
defence amounts to theft. The clause, however, does not justify
the causing of death in all cases in which the offence of theft is
being committed. The clause means that when the act is such as
per se to cause a reasonable apprehension that death or grievous
hurt will be the result, then the causing of death in order to prevent
the commission of such act is justified.
As for sariqah under section 32, the circumstances are such as
may reasonably cause apprehension that death or hurt will be the
consequence, if such right of private defence is not exercised. Section
32 of the Order uses the word “hurt” as opposed to “grievous
hurt” used in section 103 of the Code. In the context of this
paper, what is important to address is the issue of whether there is
a difference between “hurt” and “grievous hurt” under Shari`ah
law. It would suffice to note that the Brunei Penal Code specifically
addresses the difference between “hurt”46 and “grievous hurt”.47
The paper argues that though section 32 of the Order uses the
word “hurt” instead of “grievous hurt” in defence of property
involving sariqah justifying the killing of the wrongdoer, it is
important to note that the concept of hurt is given a wider meaning
under the Order. This can be seen from section 168, which lists
down the kinds of hurt. Hence, the paper submits that the kinds
of hurt enumerated in the section cover cases of grievous hurt as
well. For example, section 168(b) provides a kind of hurt known
as “itlaf-salahiyyat-al-udhw” that is the destruction or permanent
impairment of the function or use of any part of the body, or
permanently disfiguring such part.
Furthermore, dissimilarity also exits in terms of the operation
of the right of private defence of property by virtue of section 97
of the Code and section 26 of the Order. This is because section103
of the Code and section 32 of the Order cannot be understood in
isolation without making reference to section 97 and section 26
respectively. By virtue of section 97(b), a person has a right to
defend his own and another person’s property against any offences
or attempts to commit any offences to property. In other words,
the right of defence of property extends to one’s own property or
another person’s property. On the other hand, section 26(b) allows
the owner to exercise his right of private defence of property
regarding his own property, the property of his wife or descendant.
The implication of section 26(b) is that the right of private defence
of property cannot be extended to another person’s property except,
if the person is his wife or descendant.
The right of private defence of property only comes into operation
when certain specified offences against property are committed or
attempted to be committed. It is not necessary that one of the
offences enumerated under the sections (i.e., section 103 of the
Code or section 32 of the Order) should have been actually
committed; it is enough if there is an attempt to commit any of
those offences. If a man’s property is in imminent danger of being
impaired or attacked, he has the right to resort to such measures
as would be reasonably necessary to thwart the attempt to protect
his property. As mentioned above, both section 103 of the Code
and section 32 of the Order set out the situations whereby the
right of private defence of property extend to the voluntary causing
of death or harm to the wrongdoer. However, the operation of the
right of private defence justifying the killing of the wrongdoer is
limited by both section 99 of the Code and section 28 of the
Order which are identical with no linguistic alterations.
Accordingly, the paper recommends the following.
Firstly, the term “sariqah” under section 32(b) of the Order
should be interpreted by the Shariah courts to include all offences
ejusdem generis. A similar approach should also be taken by the
courts in addressing the offence of hirabah. It is important to note
that so far as the defence of one’s right to property is concerned,
section 32(b) mentions only two offences (sariqah and hirabah)
against which the right is said to exist. The paper submits that the
right being declared to exist against sariqah must be deemed to
exist against all offences ejusdem generis.
Secondly, the term “hurt” should be interpreted in line with
the spirit of section 168 of the Order. By doing so, it would make
no difference that section 32 uses the word “hurt” instead of
“grievous hurt” as can be seen in section 103(d) of the Code.
Thus, the question of saying that how come can someone be
allowed to kill a thief when there is danger of simple hurt to his
body would not stand to hinder the operation of the right of
private defence of property.
Thirdly, the right of private defence of property under the
Order should be extended to cover another person’s property
instead of limiting its operation to the owner’s property, the
property of his wife or descendant. This limitation is brought
about by section 26(b) of the Order. Therefore, for the sake of
uniformity, section 26(b) should embrace the language of section
97(b) of the Code. In other words, there is a need to harmonise
the operation of the two sections in terms of the operation of the
right of private defence of property.
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